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Case No. 20010585-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from an order dismissing the information charging defendant with 
engaging in a clandestine laboratory operation, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l) (1998), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance or 
counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 1999). The dismissal resulted from the trial court's order 
granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err in suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant 
based on the affiant's failure to advise the magistrate of a previous warrantless entry into the 
searched premises? 
. .- " • ' . 1 -
Presentation of the Issue. The issue here was preserved in the State's Objection to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, R. 81-100, its Response to Defense's Supplemental 
Memorandum, R. 125-132, and at the hearing on the motion to suppress, R. 195. 
Standard of Review. "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.) {citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994), cert, 
denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996)). When challenging a trial court's findings, the appellant 
"must first marshal all of the evidence that supports the trial court's findings" and then 
"show that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44, f 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108 (emphasis in original); accord State v. Galvan, 2001 UT 
App 329,16, 37 P.3d 1197. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, reproduced below, is 
relevant to a determination of this case. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Based on evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, defendant was charged with 
engaging in a clandestine laboratory operation and unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, both first degree felonies. R. 2-4. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. R. 49-78. Following an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court granted defendant's motion and ordered that the evidence be suppressed. R. 113, 
134-45, 174-80.! Because the State could not proceed absent the evidence, the charges were 
dismissed on the State's motion. R. 181-83. The State timely appealed. R. 184-87. The 
case was thereafter transferred to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
R. 193. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Officers Keith Olson and Ken Ouellette received information from two confidential 
informants that a man named "Randy Kawalski" was manufacturing methamphetamine in 
unit 16 of Midvale Self Storage. R. 162-63; R. 195: 4-6, 9. Based on that information, 
Officer Michael McNaughton of the Metro Narcotics Task Force drove to the storage shed 
facility just after 4 o'clock p.m. R. 195: 4-7. Upon arrival, Officer McNaughton observed 
'The memorandum decision granting the motion to suppress, R. 134-45, is 
reproduced in Addendum A. 
The State objected to defendant's proposed findings and conclusions. R. 154-66. 
The memorandum decision ruling on those objections, R. 167-73, is reproduced in 
Addendum B. 
The "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting Motion to Suppress" 
entered by the trial court, R. 174-80, is reproduced in Addendum C. 
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a pickup truck, registered to defendant Randy Krukowski, parked directly in front of unit 16. 
R. 195: 5. The overhead, garage-type door was closed, but the adjoining hinged door leading 
into the storage shed was open a couple of inches. R. 195: 6, 16. Officer McNaughton 
requested that a K-9 unit report to the site. R. 195: 6. Shortly after the K-9 unit arrived, 
M 
Officers Olsen and Ouellette also arrived on the scene. R. 195: 9. ^ 1 
Officer McNaughton asked the dog handler to check units 15 through 18. R. 195: 7-8, \ 
16. Neither Officer McNaughton nor the other officers on the scene told the dog handler 
which unit they suspected housed the lab. R. 195: 9-10. The dog picked up the scent of 
narcotics in front of unit 15, but based on the direction of the wind and the handler's training < 
and experience, the handler identified unit 16 as the site where the narcotics were located. 
R. 195:8, 17-18. 
' i 
Officer McNaughton testified that although he believed probable cause existed to 
obtain a search warrant, he did not immediately seek a warrant because he believed that 
someone was inside the unit. R. 195: 12, 19. Instead, Officer McNaughton knocked on the 
partially-open door of unit 16. R. 195: 10, 12. Defendant answered the door, stepped 
outside, and closed the door behind him. R. 195: 10. Officer McNaughton identified himself ^ 
and advised defendant that police had information that there was a "drug problem" in the 
storage facility. R. 195: 12. Defendant denied any drug problem there. R. 195: 13. 
i 
Officer McNaughton then asked defendant for permission to go inside the storage 
shed to check. R. 195: 13. Defendant asked if the officers had a search warrant. R. 195: 13. 
When Officer McNaughton told defendant that they did not have a warrant, defendant < 
4 
refused to consent to a search. R. 195: 13. Notwithstanding defendant's refusal, Officer 
McNaughton and another officer entered the storage shed. R. 195: 13-14. Officer 
McNaughton testified that he entered the storage shed because he was concerned that others 
might be inside the shed, that the chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine 
posed a safety risk, and that those chemicals might be disposed of in an unsafe manner. R. 
195: 13-15,22-23. Upon entering, the officers saw a methamphetamine lab, but did not see 
any other people inside the premises. R. 195: 14. Upon verifying that no one was else was 
present, the officers immediately exited the premises. R. 195: 14. After exiting the storage 
shed, Officer McNaughton left to obtain a search warrant, leaving defendant with the other 
officers. R. 195: 14,22-23. 
Officer McNaughton prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant, and after 
he submitted it to a magistrate for review, a warrant was issued authorizing the search of unit 
16. R. 195: 20.2 Officer McNaughton did not advise the magistrate that he had already 
entered the storage shed and seen a methamphetamine laboratory. R. 195: 21. Officer 
McNaughton testified that he did not so inform the magistrate because he was not relying on 
that information as part of his probable cause showing. R. 195: 21-22. After securing the 
search warrant, officers searched unit 16, seized the contraband, and arrested defendant. See 
R. 195:21. 
2The "Affidavit for Search Warrant," R. 160-66, is reproduced in Addendum D. 
Details of the affidavit are discussed in the body of the brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's finding that Officer McNaughton initially entered the storage shed 
not for safety reasons, but to satisfy himself that a search warrant would yield the seizure of 
a methamphetamine lab, was clearly erroneous. The trial court based its finding on the 
erroneous legal conclusion that whenever an officer seeking a search warrant has already 
entered the premises to be searched, he or she must disclose that fact to the magistrate in the 
search warrant affidavit. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the United States Supreme 
Court has not compelled that disclosure and failure to include such information does not 
necessarily constitute an omission that is material to the probable cause finding. Because the 
trial court's rejection of Officer McNaughton's testimony is premised on its misconception 
of the law, its finding is clearly erroneous. The court also unduly focused on the illegality 
of the initial, presumably unlawful entry. In doing so, the trial court improperly ignored the 
evidence supporting the officer's concerns for safety and imposed a remedy disproportionate 
to the harm. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A DULY EXECUTED 
SEARCH WARRANT 
The sole issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in suppressing evidence 
obtained pursuant to a search warrant on the ground officers had made a prior, presumptively 
unlawful entry and had failed to so notify the magistrate when seeking the warrant. 
' • 6 '" . 
I. 
MURRAY AND THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE DOCTRINE 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S.Ct. 2529 (1988), governs this case.3 In 
Murray, federal law enforcement agents lawfully stopped and seized two vehicles which both 
contained marijuana. 487 U.S. at 535, 108 S.Ct. at 2532. Agents seized the vehicles after 
observing them enter and subsequently leave a warehouse while under surveillance in a drug 
trafficking investigation. Id. After the vehicle searches uncovered the marijuana, agents 
converged on the warehouse and forced entry without a warrant. Id. Agents found no one 
inside, but saw in plain view a large number of wrapped bales later found to contain 
marijuana. Id. The agents exited without disturbing the bales, placed the warehouse under 
surveillance, and secured a search warrant. Id. "In applying for the warrant, the agents did 
not mention the prior warrantless entry, and did not rely on any observations made during 
that entry." Id. at 535-36,108 S.Ct. at 2532. After securing the warrant, agents searched the 
warehouse and seized 270 bales of marijuana. Id. at 487 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 2532. 
In upholding the second search, the Supreme Court relied on the "independent source" 
doctrine, which, the Court explained, is traditionally "applied in the exclusionary rule context 
. . . with reference to that category of evidence acquired by an untainted search which is 
3The trial court concluded that Murray does not apply to the facts of this case. R. 
179, at Tf 11. The trial court attempted to distinguish Murray from this case, explaining 
that Murray says nothing about how the validity of a warrant is undermined by a failure to 
disclose a prior warrantless entry. See R. 140-43. The trial court's conclusion is 
incorrect. As in Murray, the officers here "did not mention the prior warrantless entry" in 
applying for the warrant. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 535-36, 108 S.Ct. at 2532. As 
explained hereafter, Murray's analysis applies. 
7 
identical to the evidence unlawfully acquired'." Id. at537-38, 108 S.Ct. at 2533-34 (emphasis 
in original). Under the doctrine, evidence discovered through an unlawful search is 
considered to be untainted if it is later obtained from activities independent of the prior 
illegality. Id, 537-39, 108 S.Ct. at 2533-34 (quoting United States v. &7ves/n, 787 F.2d736, 
739 (1st Cir. 1986)). Murray explained the rationale underlying the doctrine as follows: 
"The interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public 
interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly 
balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they 
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. . . . When 
the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence 
would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent 
any error or violation." 
Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. at 2533 (quotingNix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,443, 104 
S.Ct. 2501,2509 (1984)) (emphasis in original). One month before Murray, this Court came 
to the same conclusion, holding "that evidence which is in plain view during an illegal entry 
and later seized pursuant to a valid warrant based upon independent information, may be 
admissible under either the 'independent source' or the 'inevitable discovery' doctrine." 
State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah App. 1988).4 
In Murray, the petitioner complained that application of the doctrine would encourage < 
officers to first make a warrantless entry to verify their suspicions before seeking a warrant. 
Id. at 539, 108 S.Ct. at 2534. The Court observed that such a practice would be not be wise 
4The Supreme Court in Murray observed that "[t]he inevitable discovery doctrine, 
with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source 
doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an 
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered." 
487 U.S. at 539, 108 S.Ct. at 2534 (emphasis in original). 
8 
( 
because the officer uwould risk suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and 
unseen, since his action would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there 
is probable cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no 
information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officer's 
decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it. Id. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 
2534. Thus, where an unlawful entry precedes a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, the 
evidence is not subject to suppression so long as the State demonstrates to the trial court that 
(1) the officer's decision to seek the warrant was not prompted by what was seen or seized 
during the unlawful entry, and (2) the information obtained from the unlawful entry did not 
impact the magistrate's decision to issue the search warrant. See id.; accord United States 
v. May, 214 F.3d 900,906 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 891,121 S.Ct. 217 (2000). If the 
State satisfies both prongs, the subsequently seized evidence is not suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED FROM AN INDEPENDENT 
SOURCE AND SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED. 
Applying the independent source doctrine as articulated in Murray to the facts here, 
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant should not have been suppressed. 
A. THE OFFICER'S DECISION TO SEEK A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT PROMPTED 
BY HIS OBSERVATION OF THE CLANDESTINE LAB DURING THE UNLAWFUL 
ENTRY. 
The first inquiry under Murray, and the basis of the court's ruling below, is whether 
Officer McNaughton's decision to seek the warrant was prompted by his observation of the 
9 
methamphetamine lab during the prior entry. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 
2534, May, 214 F.3d at 906. The trial court found that Officer McNaughton "would not have 
sought a search warrant but for his illegal observations of the inside of the storage area/' R. 
177, at f 6, see also R. 179, at ff 13-14. The court discounted Officer McNaughton's 
i 
testimony that he entered the shed for safety reasons, finding instead that he "entered the 
storage shed initially [ ] to investigate the case further before deciding whether to seek a 
warrant." R. 179, at If 13. 
Because of the trial court's advantaged position in assessing credibility, these findings 
are accorded deference and thus will only be set aside upon a showing of clear error. See \ 
State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 45, 20 P.3d 342. Clear error will be found where "the trial 
court's findings so lack support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence'". State 
i 
v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at % 17 n. 2,1 P.3d 1108 (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 312 (Utah 1998)) (other internal quotes and citations omitted). However, clear error 
will also be found if the trial court operated under "a misconception of the law with respect 
to which a correct view would have produced a different result." See State v. Mecham, 23 
Utah 2d 18, 21, 456 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1969). That was the case here. < 
The trial court offered two reasons for discounting Officer McNaughton's testimony 
and finding instead that he entered the storage shed "to satisfy himself that there was a basis 
to go to the effort to obtain a search warrant." R. 169. First, the court rejected the officer's 
explanation because he did not advise the magistrate of his initial entry into the storage shed 
and of his resulting observation of the methamphetamine lab. R. 169-70. Second, the court < 
10 
rejected the officer's explanation because the evidence did not justify a protective sweep of 
the premises. R. 170; R. 178, at 1fl[ 7-9. 
Marshaling the evidence that supports the trial court's finding, Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 
U 17 n. 2, the search warrant affidavit reveals that Officer McNaughton did not, in fact, 
apprise the magistrate of his initial entry into the storage shed and observation of the 
clandestine lab. See R. 160-66. Indeed, Officer McNaughton testified at the suppression 
hearing that he considered including that information, but ultimately chose to withhold it. 
R. 195: 21. It might thus be inferred, as the trial court did, that Officer McNaughton 
concealed the initial entry from the magistrate for fear it would jeopardize the prospect of 
securing a search warrant. See R. 169. Other evidence supporting the trial court's finding 
includes Officer McNaughton's testimony that no evidence suggested other people were 
inside the storage shed and that the shed did not have a back exit. R. 195: 22-23. Absent any 
articulable threat to safety, it might be inferred, again as the trial court did, that Officer 
McNaughton's safety explanation was no more than "an attempt to justify the search after 
it was called into question." R. 170. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing evidence, the trial court's finding constituted clear 
error because it rested on the court's misinterpretation of the holding in Murray and its undue 
emphasis on the presumed illegality of the initial entry. Had the court correctly interpreted 
and applied the law, a different finding would have necessarily resulted. See Mecham, 23 
Utah 2d at 21, 456 P.2d at 158. 
U 
1. The Trial Court Misconstrued the Holding in Murray and 
Improperly Extended It Under the Franks Doctrine, Thus Resulting 
in a Clearly Erroneous Finding. 
The overriding reason the trial court discounted Officer McNaughton's explanation 
for making the initial, warrantless entry was Officer McNaughton's failure to so apprise the 
magistrate of that entry and of his resulting observation of the clandestine lab. The court 
explained: . 
Based upon the fact that Detective McNaughton did not advise [the 
magistrate] of the fact that he had made an illegal entry into the 
defendant's premises, and did in fact ascertain that there was drug 
manufacturing in the defendant's premises when he was presenting 
information to [the magistrate] for issuance of a warrant, this Court has 
little confidence in the testimony of Detective McNaughton on this issue. 
R. 169-70. This conclusion was based on the trial court's erroneous view that (1) the holding 
i 
in Murray requires an officer to include that information in a search warrant affidavit, and 
(2) failure to do so constitutes a material omission under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 
98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978). As explained below, the trial court misconstrued these cases. < 
a) Murray Does Not Require Disclosure of a Prior Police Entry for 
a Magistrate's Review. 
In its memorandum decision granting the motion to suppress, the trial court interpreted { 
Murray as "requiring] an officer to inform a magistrate of the prior illegal entry in order to 
meet the heightened burden of convincing the magistrate that whatever was found during that 
initial illegal entry was not used to establish probable cause." R. 142-43. The trial court 
continued, explaining that "[a] magistrate who is not informed of the illegal entry would have 
no way of making this assessment and would, in fact, be applying a lesser burden than 
1 2 -•• ' 
i 
required under Murray." R. 143. Contrary to the court's conclusion, Murray does not 
require that police inform the magistrate of a prior entry in the search warrant affidavit. 
In support of its conclusion that Murray requires disclosure in the affidavit of any 
prior entry, the trial court points to Murray's holding that an officer who unlawfully enters 
the premises before securing a search warrant "add[s] to the normal burden of convincing 
a magistrate that there is probable cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial 
court that no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement 
officers' decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it." Murray, 487 
U.S. at 540,108 S.Ct. at 2534-35 (emphasis added); seeR. 142. That holding, however, does 
not stand for the proposition espoused by the trial court. 
The court below confuses the respective roles of the magistrate and the trial court. 
Murray does not indicate, as the trial court suggests, that the role of the magistrate includes 
a determination of the effect of a prior, warrantless entry on the admissibility of evidence 
later seized pursuant to a search warrant. Instead, the holding outlines the burdens of the 
State, before both the magistrate and the trial court, in cases where a search warrant is 
preceded by a warrantless entry. First, as in any undertaking to obtain a search warrant, the 
government must meet "the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there improbable 
causer Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534 (emphasis added). Second, the 
government must meet the added burden of "convincing a trial court that no information 
gained from the illegal entry affected either [(1)] the law enforcement officer's decision to 
seek a warrant[,] or [(2)] the magistrate's decision to grant it." Id (emphasis added). 
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Thus, contrary to the trial court's conclusion below, Murray does not require an 
affiant to advise the magistrate of a prior warrantless entry to enable the magistrate to 
determine the admissibility of the evidence in light of any prior entry. That determination 
rests with the trial court. See Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (stating that "[preliminary questions \ 
concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court"); cf. Galvan, 
2001 UT App 329, at f 5 (stating standard of review for trial court's decision to grant or deny 
motion to suppress). The magistrate's role is limited to determining probable cause. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-17.5(1 )(c) (Supp. 1997) (granting magistrates authority to issue 
search warrants). ( 
b) Failure to Disclose a Prior Police Entry Does Not Constitute a 
Material Omission Under Franks. 
' " " . • " . " ' . < 
Based on its mistaken view that Murray imposes a greater probable cause burden 
whenever a prior entry has been made, the trial court concluded that a failure to apprise the 
magistrate of that prior entry "amounts to a material omission under [the] Franks [doctrine]." < 
R. 143; see also R. 178. As explained above, the underlying premise of that conclusion is 
wrong, and, as a result, the conclusion is invalid. Moreover, that conclusion is also incorrect 
A 
because it amounts to a per se rule of materiality. Franks and its progeny reject such a rule 
of suppression. 
Under the Franks doctrine, "a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to 
challenge the validity of a search warrant if the defendant can establish that (i) an affiant in 
an affidavit supporting a search warrant made a false statement intentionally, knowingly, or
 ;< 
14 
< 
with reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii) the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding 
of probable cause after the misstatement is set aside." State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 
(Utah) {citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1565 
(1987). The Franks doctrine also applies "when a misstatement occurs because information 
is omitted." Id, Accordingly, "[i]f an affidavit fails to support a finding of probable cause 
after the false statements are excised or the omitted information is added, i.e., if the omission 
or misstatement materially affects the finding of probable cause, any evidence obtained under 
the improperly issued warrant must be suppressed." Id, 
As explained above, Murray did not alter the probable cause requirements for a search 
warrant. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534 (requiring officers to satisfy "the 
normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable cause" plus the burden of 
"convincing a trial court" that issuance of the warrant was not affected by the information 
gained from the unlawful entry). The standard of probable cause remains the same. The 
search warrant affidavit must include sufficient information "to allow [the magistrate] to 
determine probable cause." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333 
(1983). In other words, the officer must demonstrate that a substantial basis exists for 
believing that evidence of illegal conduct will be found in the place described in the warrant. 
See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 16, 436 Utah Adv. Rep 27. 
Certainly, an officer seeking a warrant must act in good faith. See Franks, 438 U.S. 
at 164, 98 S.Ct. at 2681. The information included in a search warrant affidavit must be 
"appropriately accepted by the affiant as true." Id. at 165, 98 S.Ct. at 2681. Likewise, the 
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affiant should include all material information that would properly affect a finding of 
probable cause. See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. However, it need not include facts that are 
immaterial to the probable cause finding. See Technical Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244 
F.3d 641, 649 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[a] law enforcement official is not required to 
include everything he knows about a subject in his affidavit"), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 122 
S.Ct. 819(2002). 
An officer's motivation for making an initial warrantless entry has no bearing on that 
determination. Certainly, if information used in the affidavit originated from a prior entry, 
those circumstances should be included. Likewise, if a prior entry uncovers information that 
otherwise undercuts the probable cause showing in the affidavit, that information should also 
be included. See State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956-57 (Utah App. 1993). Neither Murray 
nor Franks requires more. 
Moreover, the Franks doctrine is not a rule designed to exclude evidence. Under 
Franks and its progeny, information omitted from a search warrant affidavit will not result 
in the suppression of the evidence seized unless it is necessary to the probable cause finding. 
See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. This is so because the very "purpose of Franks and its progeny 
is to avoid suppressing evidence when the actual facts, if known to the magistrate, would 
have resulted in a finding of probable cause." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even if Murray 
had required disclosure, Franks would not necessarily require suppression. 
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i 
c) Officer McNaughton 's Prior Entry Into the Storage Shed Was Not 
Material to a Probable Cause Determination. 
A review of the affidavit submitted to the magistrate reveals Officer McNaughton 
submitted the appropriate information for probable cause determination." See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1259-60 (Utah 1993) (holding that a warrant will be upheld so long 
as there is "a 'substantial basis' for determining that probable cause existed"). 
According to the affidavit, officers received information from two confidential 
informants—whose names, dates of birth, and addresses were known to police—that a man 
identified as "Randy Kawalski" was operating a methamphetamine laboratory in unit 16 at 
Midvale Self Storage. R. 162-63.6 The informants told officers that they had been in the 
storage unit, observed the lab, and witnessed "Randy Kawalski" manufacturing 
methamphetamine there. R. 163. The affidavit thus established that police had information 
which, if true, established that within unit 16 were controlled substance precursors, 
laboratory equipment, and supplies used in the operation of a clandestine laboratory. 
The affidavit included information establishing the veracity of the two informants. 
The affidavit indicated that both informants had provided police with a "substantial amount 
5
 Although the trial court had before it the "Affidavit for Search Warrant" at the 
suppression hearing, see R. 195: 20, it only appears in the record as an attachment to the 
State's Reply to Defendant's [Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, see R. 
195: 154-66. 
6The informants' names were not disclosed in the affidavit "for fear of physical 
retaliation." R. 165; cf. Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 193 (holding that "[a]s a matter of due 
process, the identity of a confidential informant must be disclosed only when such 
disclosure is 'essential to a fair determination of the issues'"). 
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of drug trafficking and manufacturing intelligence'' subsequently verified as true and one 
informant had provided information that led to the seizure of three clandestine 
methamphetamine laboratories within the previous fifteen days. R. 165; see State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (holding that informant's veracity may be established with 
an indication that informant had previously given truthful information to police); State v. 
Doyle, 918 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App.) (observing that "[t]he confidential informant's 
corroboration was deemed to be reliable because this informant had provided the police with 
reliable information in the past"), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). The affidavit also 
noted that neither informant was a suspect in the investigation. R. 165. < 
Finally, the affidavit included information corroborating the informants' claims and 
confirming that the methamphetamine lab was still in operation. The affidavit indicated that 
< 
Officer Kevin Hanson responded to the site with his dog Django, which was certified in 
narcotics detection. R. 163-64. The affidavit indicated that Django trained in narcotics 
detection with Officer Hanson four to five times each week, accumulating 700-800 hours of 
narcotics training, and successfully found drugs in 38 of 98 searches in the past eight months 
(including five of seven storage sheds). R. 164. Django walked by four storage sheds, but < 
was guided away from unit 16 because the door was slightly ajar. R. 163. The affidavit 
indicated that Django hit on the area immediately south of unit 16, under the door of unit 15. 
R. 163. Although the wind was blowing from the south toward the open door of unit 16, 
Officer Hanson determined that based on his training and experience, "the wind was blowing 
into the slightly open door of unit 16 and going into unit 16 then circling around to unit 15 J 
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where it was coming out from under the door." R. 163. This determination by Officer 
Hanson was made even though he had not been advised of the lab's suspected location. R. 
195: 9-10. The positive hit on unit 16 thus corroborated the informants' claims and 
confirmed that the lab was still in operation. See Doyle, 918 P.2d at 144 (holding that police 
search of trash uncovering evidence corroborated informant's claim). 
Under these circumstances, including the established veracity of the informants and 
the corroboration of their information, "there [was] a fair probability that the contraband 
[would] be found in the place described." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130.7 As such, a substantial 
basis existed for the magistrate's determination that there was probable cause for the search 
of unit 16. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1259-60. 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Officer McNaughton's prior entry into the storage 
shed and his observation of the clandestine lab would have added nothing to the magistrate's 
probable cause review. As stated above, Officer McNaughton's motivation for first entering 
the storage shed is immaterial to any probable cause determination. Even had the officer 
entered for an impermissible reason, that in no way undercuts the information that supported 
the probable cause finding. Moreover, a review of the affidavit reveals that none of the facts 
described in the affidavit originated from the warrantless entry by Officer McNaughton. See 
R. 160-66. As found by the trial court, "[t]he search warrant affidavit ma[de] no mention of 
Other information in the affidavit also supported the probable cause finding. For 
example, the affidavit indicated that Officer McNaughton confirmed that the person who 
was presently in the storage shed bore a name remarkably similar to that provided by the 
informants. R. 163 ("Randy Krukowski" rather than "Randy Kawalski"). 
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the unlawful entry by the police or of their having found the clandestine laboratory." R. 177 
(emphasis added). Therefore, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, no reason existed to 
include that information in the search warrant affidavit because it would not have materially 
affected the probable cause finding. 
Indeed, including that information would have in fact subjected the evidence to a 
subsequent probable cause challenge under the Franks doctrine, which has been extended 
to illegally obtained information. Six years after Franks, the United States Supreme Court 
observed that if illegally obtained information is included in a search warrant affidavit, it will 
"invalidate the warrant for the search . . . if it proved to be critical to establishing probable 
cause for the issuance of the warrant." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719, 104 S.Ct. 
3296,3305 (1984) (emphasis added). However, citing Franks, the Supreme Court held that 
"if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable 
cause, the warrant [is] nevertheless valid." Id (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 172, 98 S.Ct. at 
2685); accord United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (10th Cir.1990). Thus, where a 
magistrate issues a search warrant supported by an affidavit that includes illegally obtained 
information, the trial court must determine whether the affidavit established probable cause 
after redacting the tainted information. See United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964,969 (5th 
Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1049, 113 S.Ct. 968 (1993); see also United States v. 
Perez, —F.3d—,Nos. 00-5237,00-5238,00-5261,2002 WL 171241, * 17-18 (3rd Cir. Feb. 
4, 2002); United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 692-93 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 
1048, 120 S.Ct. 585 (1999); United States v. Shamaeizadeh, 80 F.3d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Hogan, 38 F.3d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 
1008, 115 S.Ct. 1323(1995). 
Had Officer McNaughton apprised the magistrate of his prior entry and observations, 
as the trial court concluded he should have, the warrant would have been subject to a 
probable cause challenge under the Franks doctrine. The trial court would have thus been 
required to redact the information and determine whether the affidavit established probable 
cause without it. Indeed, Officer McNaughton frankly testified that he did not include that 
information because he did not want it to form a basis of the probable cause determination. 
See R. 195:21 (testifying that he did not include it because he "was not using that as part of 
[his] probable cause"). His very concerns that such information might have influenced the 
magistrate appear to have been validated when the trial court asked, "You don't think it 
would have been helpful for [the magistrate] to know whether or not you had been in there 
and actually saw what you wanted the warrant for to determine whether or not you had 
sufficient probable cause on the other materials you did tell him about?" R. 195: 21. 
* * * 
In sum, because the trial court erroneously concluded that Murray required Officer 
McNaughton to apprise the magistrate of his initial entry into the storage shed and of his 
observation of the clandestine lab, it wrongly discounted his testimony. SeeR. 142-43,169-
70. As explained above, Murray did not require him to do so to meet his probable cause 
burden. Accordingly, failure to disclose that information did not constitute a material 
omission. Indeed, the officer's decision to withhold that information appears to have been 
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made to safeguard the probable cause finding. In any event, the omission should not have 
been held against him and because the court did so, its finding discounting his testimony is 
clearly erroneous. 
2. The Trial Court Improperly Premised Its Finding on the Illegality of , 
the Initial Entry. 
The second and subordinate reason offered by the trial court for rejecting Officer 
McNaughton's testimony was that the evidence did not justify a protective sweep of the i 
premises. R. 170; R. 178, at ^ flf 7-9. In finding that the officer initially entered to verify his 
suspicions, the trial court also indicated that it could "recallf ] nothing in the testimony or the 
documents that would suggest that there was a 'protective sweep' as a reason of the illegal 
entry, or that the officers believed they had a basis to make a 'protective sweep' in the face 
of the defendant's objections " R. 170. The officer, however, never attempted to justify 
the entry as a "protective sweep," but simply indicated that he did so for safety reasons. See 
R. 195: 13-15, 22-23. Nevertheless, the trial court focused on the legality of the entry,
 ( 
observing that "[t]he search of the storage shed was not a protective sweep, for the protective 
sweep doctrine eipplies only when the police are arresting someone inside a home and have 
i 
a reasonable suspicion that an additional suspect may be lurking nearby and posing a threat 
to those on the arrest scene." R. 178, at f 8. Because defendant was simply being detained, 
the court concluded "the protective sweep doctrine had no application." R. 178, at ^ 9. * 
The trial court thus further rejected the officer's testimony based on the illegality of 
the initial entry. Yet, admissibility of evidence under Murray does not depend on the legality 
n 
i 
of the prior entry—a Murray analysis assumes that the prior entry was unlawful. See, e.g., 
Murray, 487 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 2532 (case assuming that the initial entry was 
unlawful); Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1292 (finding the initial entry into the home unlawful). 
Here, the State conceded that the initial entry was unlawful and any further analysis by the 
court regarding that illegality was therefore irrelevant. See R. 167-68. 
The trial court's undue emphasis on the illegality of the search resulted in a clearly 
erroneous finding and a remedy disproportionate to the harm. As held by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Nielsen, "[d]eterrence of police misconduct is not to be a factor in the decision to 
suppress unless the misconduct materially affects the finding of probable cause." Nielsen, 
727 P.2d at 191. "'[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the 
public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly 
balanced by putting police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in 
if no police error or misconduct had occurred . . . . ' " Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. at 
2533 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443,104 S.Ct. at 2509). As observed by the Seventh Circuit, 
"the exclusionary rule does not require the exclusion of evidence that would have been 
obtained lawfully, just in order to punish a search that did not hann the defendant in any 
sense relevant to a criminal proceeding . . . . " United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 607 
(7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1263, 109 S.Ct. 25 (1988). Yet, by placing undue 
emphasis on the illegality of the officer's first search here, that is exactly what the trial court 
did. 
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To the extent the trial court only meant to indicate that it could recall nothing in the 
officer's testimony to suggest safety concerns as a reason for the initial entry, that finding is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. See Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at f 17 n. 2. On direct 
examination, Officer McNaughton testified that he entered the storage shed after defendant's 
refusal to grant consent because he "felt that there was perhaps a safety issue there, for 
myself, and because of the fact that we had information that there was a lab inside, and the 
contamination that's associated with that, and the fact that it was possible for the defendant 
to go back inside and dispose of chemicals in an unsafe manner." R. 195: 13-14. 
Continuing, Officer McNaughton testified that he and another officer "entered the storage 
shed to check for other people inside, that may be a threat to us." R. 195: 14. Later, on 
examination of the trial court, Officer McNaughton testified that he entered before getting 
a warrant for safety reasons, explaining that he "wanted to check for other people inside the 
storage facility." R. 195:22. 
Although Officer McNaughton conceded that he had no specific information 
indicating that other persons were involved, R. 195: 22, his safety concerns were more than 
justified. Officer McNaughton testified that in his experience, "there are commonly other 
people inside" where drugs are being manufactured. R. 195:23. He testified that "[i]t is not 
uncommon to find weapons associated with people, other things to protect their business or 
their trade." R. 195:23. In other words, this was not a simple possession case, but rather one 
involving the suspected manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine. Defendant was 
thus suspected of a crime that, by its very nature, suggested a high risk of danger to officers. 
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Cf. State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346,1 15, 37 P.3d 270 (holding that dealing in large 
quantities of narcotics is a crime that, by its nature, suggests the presence of weapons). 
Moreover, Officer McNaughton's apprehensions concerning the improper or unsafe 
disposal of the chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were also warranted. 
'The dangers associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine are well known." United 
States v. D'Armond, 80 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1168 (D. Kan. 1999). The manufacture of 
methamphetamine requires the use of "dangerously toxic chemicals" and poses a "serious 
health risk" to those in the vicinity. Id, (citations omitted). These inherent dangers have 
prompted federal sentencing guidelines that enhance the sentence of any operator of a 
methamphetamine lab which is shown to create a substantial risk of harm to human life or 
the environment. See United States v. Dick, 173 F.Supp.2d 765, 769-70 (E.D. Tenn. 2001). 
The risk posed by methamphetamine labs have also prompted some courts to uphold 
warrantless searches of premises suspected of housing the labs under the exigent 
circumstances exception. See, e.g., United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir.) (holding 
that hazards posed by methamphetamine lab on premises contributed to justifiable 
warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 848, 100 S.Ct. 97 
(1979); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that risk of 
explosion of a methamphetamine lab in operation presented an exigent circumstance that 
would have justified an immediate warrantless search), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1100,104 S.Ct. 
1593(1984). 
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In sum, the trial court improperly focused on the illegality of the initial entry, which 
was conceded by the State, disregarding the officer's testimony and the legitimate safety 
concerns associated with the pursuit of those engaged in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. The trial court's dismissal of Officer McNaughton's testimony as * 
spurious was thus clearly erroneous. 
B. No INFORMATION FROM THE INITIAL ENTRY WAS RELIED ON IN THE MAGISTRATE 'S 
DECISION TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANT. ' 
The second inquiry under Murray is whether any of the information learned from the 
initial police entry affected the magistrate's decision to issue the search warrant. See 
Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534; May, 214 F.3d at 906. A review of the search 
warrant affidavit here reveals that it did not. 
i 
The search warrant affidavit cited only two circumstances as support for a finding of 
probable cause. First, the affidavit advised the magistrate that two confidential informants, 
both of whom had previously provided police with reliable information, told police they had < 
personally observed a working methamphetamine lab in unit 16 of the Midvale storage 
facility. R. 162-63, 165. Second, the affidavit explained that a sniff search by a trained K-9 
unit confirmed the presence of narcotics in unit 16 on the very day police sought the warrant. 
R. 163-64. The search warrant affidavit did not include any information indicating that 
i 
police had personally observed a methamphetamine lab in the shed, nor was any of the 
information in the affidavit obtained as a result of the initial police entry. See R. 160-66. As 
Officer McNaughton explained at the suppression hearing, he did not include that { 
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i 
information because he "was not using that as part of [his] probable cause" showing. R. 
195:21. 
Accordingly, where no information from the initial entry was included in the search 
warrant affidavit, it did not affect the magistrate's decision to grant the search warrant. See 
Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534. The trial court did not find otherwise. 
* # # 
In summary, where the trial court based its finding on an erroneous understanding of 
the law, and where the circumstances surrounding the search of a methamphetamine lab are 
inherently dangerous, the trial court's finding that Officer McNaughton entered the premises 
simply to verify his suspicions was clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial 
court's order suppressing the evidence and remand the case for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this \Sh day of March, 2002. 
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RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI, 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 991922816 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on September 22, 
2000, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Suppress. The 
prosecutioi i el i cited testimony from Detective Michael McNaughton. 
Following Detective McNaughton1s testimony, the Court heard 
argument from counsel and took the matter under advisement to 
consider the law in 1 igl it of the facts The Court also granted 
leave to the defense to file supplemental memoranda by October 13, 
2000. The State was given leave to respond by October 27, 2000. 
Having now reviewed the movinnj -indl responding memoranda, as well as 
the supplemental pleadings filed by both sides, and having 
reflected upon the law and argument from counsel, the Court rules 
as stated herein. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The following facts were elicited during the suppression 
hearing, Detective McNaughton was informed about two confidential 
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informants who had witnessed the operation of a methamphetamine 
laboratory inside unit #16 of the Midvale Self Storage facility. 
According to the informants, they had observed an individual named 
"Randy Kawalski" manufacturing the methamphetamine. 
After receiving this information, Detective McNaughton, along 
with other officers, drove to the Storage Facility. The officers 
observed a truck parked near unit #16, registered to the defendant. 
The "man door" to this unit was slightly ajar. 
Detective McNaughton then summoned a Murray City Police K-9 
handler, Officer Hanson, and his police service dog, Django. Upon 
their arrival, Officer Hanson guided Django along units #15 to #18. 
Django indicated the presence of narcotics in front of the man door 
to unit #15. However, Officer Hanson apparently discerned from the 
dog's actions and the way that the wind was blowing that the 
narcotics were in fact in unit #16. 
The officers approached unit #16 and knocked on the door. The 
defendant came to the door and stepped outside, shutting the door 
behind him. The officers asked the defendant who he was and 
informed him that they had received information about drugs being 
manufactured in the storage unit. The officers then requested 
permission to go inside the storage unit. The defendant declined 
when he was informed that the officers did not have a search 
warrant. 
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Detective McNaughton testified that it was then decided to 
enter the unit anyhow to do a "protective sweep." The State has 
since conceded, that "off j cers' warrantless entry of the defendant's 
storage unit, for the purposes of conducting a protective sweep, 
was illegal." (State's Response to Defense's Supplemental 
Memorandum at p. 1). There are no facts to justify a protective 
sweep. 
After entering the storage unit, the officers observed what 
appeared, tc 1 - andestine methamphetamine 1 ab. The officers 
turned the power off to unit #16 and briefly interviewed the 
defendant. The defendant remained with other officers at the 
storage ui lit while Detective McNaughton ] eft the storage unit to 
prepare a search warrant application. 
In reviewing the search warrant affidavit, there is clearly no 
mention that the officers had already entered storage unit #16 and 
observed the drug manufacturing items. When asked about this 
omission, Detective McNaughton informed the Court that he did not 
think the magistrate who would be review,,:! i ig the search warrant 
affidavit needed to know that the officers had already gained entry 
and searched the storage unit before obtaining a search warrant. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The defendant contends that the officers' failure to inform 
the magistrate that they had observed the drug manufacturing items 
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after gaining illegal entry into the storage unit, invalidates the < 
search warrant under Franks v, Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978). 
The State counters that the search warrant in this case is valid 
because it included only the information obtained prior to the
 i 
officer's entry into the storage unit. Therefore, the State 
contends that while the evidence in this case may have been seized 
after the officers' illegal entry into the storage unit, it was
 ( 
nonetheless seized pursuant to a valid search warrant "which was 
based upon information from a source independent of the illegal 
entry." State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (discussing Seaura v. United States. 468 U.S. 796 (1984)). 
Since the State has advanced an "inevitable discovery" theory, 
the analysis of the defendant's Motion to Suppress necessarily 
begins with Sequra. In that case, drug enforcement agents 
illegally entered and secured Segura's apartment while waiting for 
a search warrant to be obtained. In determining whether the 
illegality of the initial entry required suppression of evidence 
later obtained under a valid warrant, the United States Supreme 
Court held: "Whether the initial entry was illegal or not is 
irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence because 
there was an independent source for the warrant under which that 
evidence was seized." Seaura, 468 U.S. at 813-14. Since no 
information obtained during the initial illegal entry and 
4 
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occupation of the apartment was used by the agents to secure the 
warrant (because the agents possessed information that Segura was 
trafficking cocai ne even before they entered the apartment), the 
warrant was determined to have been based on a source of 
information independent from the unlawful conduct. Id. at 814. 
The Utah Court :)f Appeal s in State v. Northrup. 756 P. 2d 1288 
(Utah App. 1988), interpreted Segura and its application to 
evidence that is observed in plain view during the initial illegal 
entry. In that case, the cour t re iter ated the predomi nant view 
that Seaura requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether "the evidence 
is seized pursuant valid search warrant; and (2) if the 
warrant is based upon information truim a source i ndependent of 
illegal entry." Id. at 1292. It is interesting to note, that 
neither Segura nor Northrup address the first step of this inquiry, 
the validity of the search warrant, because \ ml i ke the present 
defendant, neither Segura nor Northrup challenged the validity of 
the search warrant. (Segura, 468 U.S. at 804 ("The only issue here 
is whethei drugs and the other items not observed during the 
initial entry and first discovered by the agents the day after the 
entry, under an admittedly valid search warrant, should have been 
suppressed.") (emphasis added); Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1292 
("Northrup's attorney stated during oral argument that he did not 
challenge the search warrant on appeal. In addition, the affidavit 
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which served as the basis of the warrant is not part of the record 
on appeal.11) . 
As discussed above, the defendant in this case does challenge 
the validity of the search warrant obtained by Detective 
McNaughton. According to the defendant, the search warrant 
affidavit on which the warrant is based is defective because it 
omits any information concerning the officers having already gained 
illegal entry into the storage unit. In support of this argument, 
the defendant relies on Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 165 
(1978) . 
In Franks. the United States Supreme Court held that an 
affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant application is 
presumed valid. Franks. 438 U.S. at 171. However, that 
presumption may be overcome by a showing that the affidavit 
contains a '"false statement [made] knowingly and intentionally, or 
with reckless disregard for the truth," Id. at 155. The Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), 
extended the Franks doctrine to include a misstatement which occurs 
because information has been omitted. Since Nielsen, other 
jurisdictions have joined in holding that "technically accurate 
statements" that "have been rendered misleading by material 
omissions" are similarly problematic. See e.g. United States v. 
Scalia. 993 F.2d 984, 987 (lsC Cir. 1993). If such a false 
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statement or material omission is present in a search warrant 
affidavit and "the affidavit fails to support a finding of probable 
cause after the false statements are excised or the omitted 
information is added, i.e. if the omission or misstatement 
materially affects the finding of probable cause, any evidence 
obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be suppressed." 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 156) (emphasis 
added). The defendant contends that under Franks, the officer's 
failure to mention the illegal entry constitutes a material 
omission which affected the finding of probable cause and which 
resulted in an improperly issued warrant. 
The issue of whether an officer must inform the magistrate of 
a prior illegal entry in the search warrant affidavit and whether 
the failure to do so invalidates the resulting search warrant is an 
issue of first impression in Utah. However, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals dealt with this precise issue in the case of 
United States v. Moscatiello. 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1985), vacated 
on other grounds (476 U.S. 1138 (1986)). 
In Moscatiello. the defendants argued that because the 
application for the warrant failed to mention the prior illegal 
entry, the warrant was tainted by that prior illegality. The court 
held that under Franks, "absent fabrication of evidence, . . . the 
mere omission of irrelevant facts from an affidavit constitutes no 
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reason to suppress the warrant. The omission did not "enhance the 
contents of the affidavit,• nor deceive the magistrate into 
granting a warrant he would otherwise not have issued . . ." Id. 
at 603 (internal citations omitted). 
Three years after the Mos tiello decision, the United States 
Supreme Court decided the case of Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 
533 (1988). Notably, Murray concerned two separate petitions of 
defendants that had been involved in the Moscatiello case. In the 
Murray decision, the Supreme Court noted the First Circuit Court's 
holding that the officers' omission was irrelevant, but did not 
review this decision. Instead, the Supreme Court focused strictly 
on the scope of the "independent source" doctrine and whether it 
applied to evidence initially discovered during, or as a 
consequence of, an unlawful search (i.e. where the evidence was in 
plain view during the unlawful search). 
The Murray case involved several law enforcement agents who 
had conducted an illegal search and observed but did not seize 
evidence that was in plain view. After the initial illegal entry, 
the agents obtained a warrant to search the warehouse where the 
evidence was located. Pursuant to the warrant, the agents seized 
the evidence they had observed earlier. The defendants argued that 
the "asserted policy basis for excluding evidence which is 
initially discovered during an illegal search, but is subsequently 
i 
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acquired through an independent and lawful source, is that a 
contrary rule will remove all deterrence to, and indeed positively 
encourage, unlawful police searches." Id. at 538. The defendants 
argued that law enforcement officers would have an incentive to 
"routinely enter without a warrant to make sure that what they 
expect to be on the premises is in fact there. If it is not, they 
will have spared themselves the time and trouble of getting a 
warrant; if it is, they can get the warrant and use the evidence 
despite the unlawful entry." Id. 
The Court stated that it viewed the incentives differently: 
An officer with probable cause sufficient to 
obtain a search warrant would be foolish to 
enter the premises first in an unlawful 
manner. By doing so, he would risk 
suppression of all evidence on the premises, 
both seen and unseen, since his action would 
add to the normal burden of convincing a 
magistrate that there is probable cause the 
much more onerous burden of convincing a trial 
court that no information gained from the 
illegal entry affected either the law 
enforcement officers9 decision to seek a 
warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant 
it. Nor would the officer without sufficient 
probable cause to obtain a search warrant have 
any added incentive to conduct an unlawful 
entry, since whatever he finds cannot be used 
to establish probable cause before a 
magistrate. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
This Court interprets this language to require an officer to 
inform a magistrate of the prior illegal entry in order to meet the 
. . I*V 
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heightened burden of convincing the magistrate that whatever was 
found during that initial illegal entry was not used to establish 
probable cause. In other words, in light of the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in MurrayP the magistrate is placed in the position of 
making a neutral and objective assessment of whether the officers 
truly did not rely on the evidence found during the illegal entry 
and whether they have proven this point under the heightened burden 
imposed because of the illegal entry. A magistrate who is not 
informed of the illegal entry would have no way of making this 
assessment and would, in fact, be applying a lesser burden than 
required under Murray. Clearly, such a result would run afoul of 
the process contemplated by the Supreme Court in Murray. 
Furthermore, since the illegal entry increases the officers' burden 
of proof, information of such entry would not be "irrelevant," as 
characterized by the Moscatiello court. To the contrary, the 
failure to inform the magistrate clearly affects the finding of 
probable cause and therefore amounts to a material omission under 
Franks. Accordingly, any evidence obtained under the search 
warrant resulting from the improper affidavit must be suppressed. 
The defendant's Motion is therefore granted. 
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Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision and submjrc the same to the Court for 
review and signature. 
Dated this ' S day of December, 2000. 
&±tt 
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IN TBI DISTRICT COURT OF TBI THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAM COUNTY, 8TATI OF UTAH 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
c
"4tbMNimii ir 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 t 2001 
„ rSff¥^jj^ 
The Court has before It proposed Plndings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for the defendant granting 
the defendant's Notion to Suppress. The Court also has the State's 
Reply to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
which sets forth a number of objections and suggestions offered by 
the State. The Court having reviewed both documents, is satisfied 
that it can sign the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
prepared by the defendant as proposed. The Court overrules the 
objections submitted by the State. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court is of the opinion that 
a number of the objections merely go to a selection of words chosen 
by the defendant to include in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to which the State objects. For example, the objection to 
Findings of Fact 3, Hforced their way into," is offensive to the 
State. The State stipulated that the officers conducted an illegal 
STATE 07 UTAH, I 
Plaintiff, t 
VS. I 
RANDY PBTKR KRUKOWSKX, S 
Defendant. t 
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entry. The evidence is that the defendant, occupier of the 
premises in question, told the officers they may not enter his 
storage shed without a proper warrant. The Court recalls no 
testimony from anyone that would suggest that the officers told the 
defendant that they were entering the premises to conduct a 
••protective sweep." As the entry into the premises was without the 
acquiescence of the defendant, it was "forced." The State seems to 
equate the word "force" with some type of physical action to remove 
the defendant from in front of the door. That is not required. 
The wording as proposed is proper and properly characterizes the 
nature of the entry in this case, even in the face of the State's 
stipulation that the entry was illegal. 
On that same issue, the State objects to the words in Findings 
of Fact 4(e), "apparently discerned." Officer Hanson, the handler 
of the dog, did not testify and his statements, conclusions or 
opinions were received through the testimony of Detective 
McNaughton. The wording is appropriate to set forth what Detective 
McNaughton had reportedly been advised by Officer Hanson. 
The State further objects to the term "manufacturing" in 
Finding of Fact 4(g). The Court has no independent recollection as 
to whether or not Detective McNaughton told the defendant that he 
was suspected of "drug activity," as opposed to "manufacturing." 
The statement is without any real significance, as clearly 
STATE V. KRUKOWSKI PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
Detective McNaughton conveyed to the defendant that he was 
suspected of some type of drug activity. The Court will make the 
pen-and-ink change, with the understanding that the State has 
referred to the transcript of the proceedings and the words used by 
Detective McNaughton were, in fact, "drug activity." 
The State objects to the statements that this Court determines 
that Detective McNaughton would not have obtained a search warrant 
but for the illegal forced entry. Whether or not that was 
specifically referred to in the Court1s Memorandum Decision, that 
Decision was only designed to be a summary of the Court's views on 
this matter, it is appropriate to include the same, as the Court is 
satisfied that the State has not shown that the search warrant 
would have been obtained but for the fact that Detective McNaughton 
performed a constitutionally invalid search of the premises before 
obtaining the warrant. If Detective McNaughton thought that he had 
a sufficient basis to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal entry 
over the objections of the defendant, he could have made that 
attempt. Detective McNaughton apparently chose to violate the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an illegal search 
to satisfy himself that there was a basis to go to the effort to 
obtain a search warrant. 
Based upon the fact that Detective McNaughton did not advise 
Judge Medley of the fact that he had made an illegal entry into the 
i 
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defendant's premises, and did in fact ascertain that there was drug 
manufacturing in the defendant's premises when he was presenting 
information to Judge Medley for issuance of a warrant, this Court 
has little confidence in the testimony of Detective McNaughton on 
this issue. The Court recalls nothing in the testimony or the 
documents that would suggest that there was a Hprotective sweep" as 
a reason for the illegal entry, or that the officers believed they 
had a basis to make a "protective sweep" in the face of the 
defendant's objections to entering his premises without a warrant 
at any time prior to the defendant calling the search into 
question. This Court is unable to find that Defective McNaughton 
and his fellow officers at the time of the illegal search intended 
to rely upon the concept of a "protective sweep" in entering the 
defendant's premises without a warrant. Rather, the conclusion was 
reached as an attempt to justify the search after it was called 
into question. The Court is not satisfied that Detective 
McNaughton was merely mistaken regarding a "protective sweep," and 
while the term "orchestrate" may overly state the Court's position, 
there are serious questions regarding this entire search and the 
reasons given for it. Detective McNaughton's statement to this 
Court when the question was asked as to why he did not tell Judge 
Medley that he had been in the building without a warrant and 
determined that there was in fact methamphetamine production going 
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on, Detective Mcffeughton responded to the effect that he did not 
think. Judge Medley needed to know that. If officers obtaining 
warrants- are the final arbitrators on what a magistrate issuing a 
warrant needs to know to conduct a proper evaluation as to whether 
a warrant ought to be issued, the concept of obtaining a warrant 
from a judge is meaningless. 
In view of the surrounding circumstances, and the statements 
of Detective HcNaughton, the Court determines that the words 
"orchestrate1* will remain. 
The remaining portions of the State's objections, even though 
not specifically addressed, are without merit. Finally, to the 
extent: that the State objects that this Court decides the matter 
under the Pranks doctrine, that objection is equally misplaced. 
This Court evaluates the propriety of the issuance of the search 
warrant, the conduct of the officers preceding thereto, and the 
quality of their testimony thereafter, to determine whether or not 
a constitutional violation occurred, whether or not counsel address 
the issues in their legal arguments, or otherwise. 
( 
STATE V, KRUKOWSKI PAGE 6 MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court has on a date contemporaneous with the date of this 
Minute Entry decision signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Lav granting the Motion to Suppress as submitted. 
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Addendum C 
STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY - 2149 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6474 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
v. 
: Case No. 991922816FS 
RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI, : Judge Timothy Hanson 
Defendant. : 
The defendant has filed a multi-faceted challenge to the search warrant issued 
in his case, and after having taken evidence and considered the positions of the parties 
set forth in oral argument and various memoranda, the Court grants the motion to 
suppress on the grounds that Detective McNaughton's failure to inform the magistrate 
in the search warrant affidavit of the officers' unlawful entry into the storage shed 
violated the Franks doctrine and that Detective McNaughton would not have sought 
a warrant absent his prior entry into the shed. 
Because this ruling is dispositive of the motion to suppress, the Court does not 
reach any other issue raised by the defendant. 
/lira judicial District 
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In support of the order granting the motion to suppress, the Court now makes 
the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 26, 1999, the police searched a storage shed pursuant to a 
nighttime search warrant issued by Third District Court Judge Tyrone E. Medley, acting 
as magistrate. 
2. The search warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit signed by Detective 
Mike McNaughton of the South Salt Lake City Police Department, and DEA Metro 
Narcotics Task Force. 
3. The affidavit in support of the warrant did not inform the magistrate that 
prior to approaching Judge Medley for a warrant, the police forced their way into the 
storage unit and found a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. 
4. The following specific events transpired prior to the drafting of the search 
warrant affidavit: 
a. Detective McNaughton was informed about two confidential informants who 
had witnessed a person named "Randy Kawalski" operating a methamphetamine 
laboratory inside unit #16 of the Midvale Self Storage facility. 
b. After receiving this information, Detective McNaughton and other officers 
drove to the storage facility, and found a truck registered to the defendant, Randy 
Krukowski, parked outside storage unit #16, which had its "man door" slightly ajar. 
i 
c. Detective McNaughton summoned Murray City Police K-9 handler, Officer 
Hanson, who ran his police service dog, Django, along units 15 through 18 of the 
storage unit. 
d. Django indicated the presence of narcotics in front of the man door to unit 
15. 
e. Based on the dog's alert and the way the wind was blowing, Officer Hanson 
apparently discerned that the narcotics were actually in unit #16. 
f. The officers approached unit #16 and knocked on the door, and Krukowski 
came outside and shut the man door behind himself. 
g. The officers asked Krukowski who he was and informed him of their 
Acr /Vf?^ - "** 
suspicions about drug wonufaoturing in unit #16. 
h. The officers asked Krukowski's permission to search the unit, but he refused 
permission upon learning that they had no warrant. 
i. The police then forced their way into the unit without lawful justification. 
j . McNaughton attempted to characterize the entry as a "protective sweep," but 
the State has correctly conceded that there was no protective sweep. 
k. After entering the storage unit, the police observed a clandestine 
methamphetamine lab. 
I. The police turned off the power to unit # 16 and detained and interviewed 
Krukowski while McNaughton obtained a search warrant. 
3 
1 
5. The search warrant affidavit makes no mention of the unlawful entry by the 
police or of their having found the clandestine laboratory. , 
6. The officer would not have sought a search warrant but for his illegal 
observations of the inside of the storage area. 
In light of the foregoing findings of fact, the Court hereby makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
2. "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures/" United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989). 
3. Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution provides protection at least as broad 
as the Fourth Amendment, and is at times construed to provide broader protection. 
See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)(plurality). See also State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991)(recognizing privacy interest in bank 
records under Article I section 14). 
4. Because it appears that Fourth Amendment law provides ample bases for 
suppression, this Court will utilize the primacy approach, addressing only the federal 
constitutional law. 
• 4 - : .• 
5. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 1 54 (1 978), the Court held that when the 
police knowingly or recklessly include material misstatements in a search warrant 
affidavit which misstatements are essential to probable cause for the warrant, 
suppression is in order. See id. at 171-72. 
6. Under the Franks doctrine, an officer is likewise forbidden to mislead by 
omission -- when facts undermining probable cause are missing from a search warrant 
affidavit, suppression is in order. See e.g. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 
(Utah), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987). 
7. In the instant matter, the search warrant affiant did not inform the magistrate 
that the police had orchestrated an unlawful search of the storage shed at issue, and 
dishonestly labeled it a "protective sweep," just prior to approaching the magistrate 
for a warrant. 
8. The search of the storage shed was not a protective sweep, for the 
protective sweep doctrine applies only when the police are arresting someone inside 
a home and have a reasonable suspicion that an additional suspect may be lurking 
nearby and posing a threat to those on the arrest scene. See e.g. Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990). 
9. In the instant matter, Mr. Krukowski was being "detained" outside a closed 
storage shed, and the protective sweep doctrine had no application. See id; 
United States v. Hooan. 38 F.3d 1148, 1150 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1008 
(1995). 
5 
10. The Court finds that this omission was material and clearly affected the 
finding of probable cause, requiring suppression under Franks. 
1 1 . The Court is not persuaded that the independent source doctrine discussed 
in Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), applies to the facts of this case. 
1 2. Under Murray, the government bears the burden to establish that the police 
were not prompted to obtain a warrant by what they found in the unlawful search, but 
would have sought a warrant on the basis of what they knew prior to entering the 
shed. See ijd. at 538 "By doing so [conducting an unlawful search], he would risk 
suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and unseen, since his action 
would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable 
cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information 
gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers' decision to 
seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it.")(emphasis added), and Murray 
at 542 (independent source doctrine does not apply if officer's decision to seek a 
warrant was prompted by what they saw in warrantless search). 
1 3. The record does not persuade the Court that Detective McNaughton would 
have sought a warrant without first entering the storage shed, but demonstrates that 
the reason that Detective McNaughton entered the storage shed initially was to 
investigate the case further before deciding whether to seek a warrant. 
14. The basis for the officer obtaining a warrant was his illegal entrance into 
the shed. 
6 
15. It was a material omission not making the court aware of the prior entry 
of the place to be searched in the affidavit. 
16. Given the absence of proof of an independent source under Murray, and 
given the Franks violation, the Court concludes that£he motion to suppress should be 
BRENDA BEATON 
Assistant Attorney General 
7 
Addendum D 
_ A J J — J r\ 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
s s 
450 South State St 
^ZuP.ESS 
i-, lececoive Xike Mc*rau~hccn of ohe IZA Mecro 
cemg :;r33 cu_y sworn, zecoses and says he has 
(X) ON THE PREMISES KNOWN AS MIDVALE SZLF STORAGE, STORAGE 
STiZD #15. FURTHER DESCRIBED AS A STORAGE SHED FACILITY WITH AN 
ADD31SSS OF 111 SOUTH ALLEN STREET, MIDVALE, UTAH. THE STORAGE FACILITY 
IS LOCATED ON THE EAST SIDE OF ALLEN STREET. STORAGE UNIT #1S IS 
LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN SIDE OF A STORAGE S7ZD COMPLEX THAT RUNS NORTH 
AND SOUTH. STORAGE S"dZD #15 HAS A GREEN COLORED OVERHEAD TYPE DOOR 
WITH A GREEN COLORED MAN DOOR LOCATED JUST SOUTH OF THE OVERHEAD DOOR. 
THE NUM3ER 16, SILVER IN COLOR, IS LOCATED DIRECTLY ABOVE THE MAN 
DOOR. THE ST03AGS S^ZD FACES WEST; 
TO INCLUDE ALL CONTAINERS, GARBAGE CANS, OR SIMILAR AREAS THAT CAN BE 
USED FOR STORAGE OR CONCEALMENT CONTAINED THEREIN. 
and in ohe Ccuncv cz Sal.™ LaJ-ce Seals of Utah chere is now csrtstin 
orccercv or evidence described as: 
(SEE ATTACHMENT A) 
iao said property cr evidence: 
(M; was unlawfully accuired or is 'unlawfully possessed, or 
(X; has been used zo cccor.ic or conceal a public offense, or 
(X; is being possessed with one purpose oo use io as a near.s of 
cc.Tjr.iocine or concealing a public offense, or 
(X) ccr.siscs of an ioem or constitutes evidence of illecal 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT/ 
SEARCH WARRANT 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
1. GLASSWARE, 70 INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO ROUND AND FLAT BOTTOM 
BILLING FLASK, FUNNELS, CONDENSER COLUMNS, SINGLE, DOUBLE AND 
TRIPLE NECK FLASKS, C077EZ POTS, STIRRING RODS, SEPARATORY 
2. HEATING MANTLES, PORTABLE ELECTRIC AND GAS STOVES. 
2.STORAGE CONTAINERS TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, GAS CANS, 
CHEMICAL BOTTLES PLASTIC, GLASS, FIBER, ?.-.?ZR, CARDBOARD AND 
PLASTIC. 
4. TUBING TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, REINFORCED SYNTHETIC 
A_ND GLASS, GARDEN y.oszs. 
5. RUBBER STOPPERS, LUBRICANTS AND SZ^LZP.S USED WITH STOPPERS 
INCLUDING DUCT TAPS AND ELECTRICAL TAPE. 
5. CKZy.ZC?.LS INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EPHEDRINE, 
PSEUDCEPHEDRINE, IODINE, PHOSPHOROUS, LYE, ACIDS AND SOLVENTS 
USED IN THE MANUFACTURING 0? METHAMPHETAMIN-Z. 
7. METHAMPHETAMINE, A SYNTHETIC SCHEDULE 2 STIMULANT IN ROCK, 
POWDER OR LIQUID FORMS. 
3. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PLASTIC 
BAGS, TAPE, 7.-.^Z?. 3INDLES CUT INTO SQUAP.E3, SC^ZS AND MATERIAL 
USED ^0 CUT OR DILUTE MSTHAMPHSTAMINZ. 
9. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE 3UT NOT LIMITED TO SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON 3ALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING OR TUBES FOR INHALING METHIAMPHETAMINZ. 
10. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR 3ILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
11. U.S. CURRENCY 3SLIZVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE 
NARCOTICS BEING 5EAR.CHED FOR, AND ANY AND ALL ITEMS DETERMINED TO 
BE COLLATERAL OR ??:0CZZDS FROM NARCOTICS TRANSACTIONS. 
12. NARCOTIC RECORDS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PRICE LISTS, 
--MOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, FINANCIAL GAIN AND 
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Your Affiant believes the property and evidence described above 
is evidence of the crime(s) of: 
Possession of a Con-rolled Substance, Possession of a Controlled 
Substance and Manufacture of a controlled substance. 
u*iS 
Officers Standards and Training. Your affiant has training in 
Your affiant, Detective Mike McNaughcon, is employed by 
South Salt Lake City Police Department and is currently assigned to 
the DEA Metro Narcotics Task Jcroe. Your affiant has beer, given the 
responsibility to investigate controlled substance distribution, 
possession and manufacturing offenses occurring in Salt Lake County 
and surrounding areas. 
Your affiant has training in'controlled substance (s) 
identification and the investigation cf controlled substance related 
offenses. Your affiant is a Certified Peace Officer in the State of 
Ytah, and has S years cf law enforcement experience. Your affiant has 
been assigned to narcotics investigations since October 1955, and has 
beer, assigned to DEA Metro Narcotics Task Force since that time. Your 
affiant has assisted in investigations of various controlled substance 
distribution operations. Your affiant's specialized training includes 
:?: 
is training 
Specialized Drug Recognition and Clandestine Laboratories 
Investigations. Your affiant has completed the Clandestine Laboratory 
Enforcement Team school from DEA and is a certified member. Your 
affiant has also attended The DEA Basic Narcotic Officers School. Your 
affiant has completed the Cannabis Detection and Eradication school 
sponsored by the DEA and the Utah Department of Public Safety, 
Criminal Investigation 3ureau. Your affiant has supervised controlled 
buys and has completed numerous hand to hand narcotics buys. Your 
affiant has assisted in the investigation, and investigated narcotics 
cases through controlled buys of narcotics, surveillance of suspected 
drug sales operations, interrogation of sus^oeczs and informants and 
investigating intelligence reports received from citizens. 
Your affiant is currently investigating a complaint relating to 
an ongoing controlled substance distribution and manufacturing 
operation being conducted at the named premises en this 
//arrant/Affidavit. 
The facts to establish grrotinds for a search warrant are: 
1
 Your affiant has received information from two confidential 
informants stating that he/she believes that an individual is engaged 
in the distribution and manufacture of controlled substances from the 
named premises. Your affiant has been supplied with the following 
information from the sources. 
i / 
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.vitnin tr.e -as: sever, cays Special Agent Keith Clscr. has spoken 
to the confidential informants (hereafter referred to as CI#1 and CI 
= 2). The CIs ^ supplied Age" Clson with ;:.:ormation concerning 
naroooio manufacturing from one listed address. The CIs informed Agent 
Clson that he s'r.a had cean inside the storage unit named on this 
affidavit/warrant and that he/she observed a me thamphet amine 
laboratory and .tiethamphetamine inside the storage unit. 
_ _ *-~ ^ - 5 
a *• AS* s- teu -r.^ :: r.andy XA///A.L5XI leased the listed storage unit and that he 
manufactures methamphetamine there. 3oth CIs stated that they have 
observed Randy KAWA1SXI manufacturing methamphetamine at the location. 
Cn October 25, 1999 your affiant went to the listed storage 
facility and observed a red colored Nissan truck parked in front of 
the listed storage -unit. Your affiant did a registration check on the 
truck and learned that the truck was registered to Randy Xrukowski. 
Arrangements were made on October 25, 1999 to have a police dog 
trained in the detection of narcotics, check the perimeter of the 
storage -unit on this Warrant/.Af f idavit for the presence of narcotics 
inside the storage unit. 
On October 25, 1999 your affiant along with other narcotic agents 
and police officers had a police service dog, hereafter referred to as 
?S2 django taken to the storage unit on this Warrant/Affidavit. PSD 
Django along with K-9 handler Kevin Hanson walked by a total of four 
storage units. As Officer Hanson and Django walkec by storage unit 
-15, Officer Hanson purposely guided Django away from unit #15 due to 
the man door being slightly ajar. .As Officer Hanson cleared the 
doorway of unit #15 he again allowed Django to smell the storage 
units."Django hit on the area immediately South of unit #15. Che wind 
was blowing from the South toward the slightly open door of 'unit #15. 
Django indicated the presence of narcotics from 'under the doorway of 
unic~#13. Officer Hanson indicated to your affiant that the wind was 
blowing into the slightly open door of -unit #15 and going into unit 
=15 then circling around to unit #13 where it was coming cut from 
-under the door. This observation is based on Officer Hanson's training 
and experience. 
Your affiant knocked on the man door of unit #15 and spoke to a 
white male who sze-c'ped outside the storage unit and immediately clcsed 
the door behind him. Your affiant asked the male if his name was Randy 
and was told ves. 
> Canine Expertise Statement 
D;angc is a 2 1/2 year eld Belgian Mai. Who began service with 
the Murray City Police Cepartment or. December 13, 1993 with handler 
^-- —-»-- -.— /—— ..»*.aw**. w.,—^«J -.—.o ^„.._ w.„_.*s-.*-.. w-s—.
—
..3 ai«. w..e ucan 
police Academy and was certified in narcotics detection. Django has 
had approximately 700-303 total hours m narcotics detection. Officer 
Hanson and Orange train every day and train in detection of narcotics 
4 to 5 days a week 
Cccicer Hanson has three vears cf law enforcement e"cc,a'M"'' ^ ^ca as a 
Murray Police Officer. 
O;ango has done a total of 9 3 drug searches during the past eight 
months with 33 drug finds. Ojango has done a total cf sever, narcotic 
searches on storage sheds with 5 narcotic finds. v 
Items to be seized: 
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for 
mechamphecamine and U.S. currency because your affiant's training and 
experience has shewn it is very common for s^szeczs of narcotics 
offenses to keep related evidence in their premises. Your affiant 
knows from training and experience that distributors of narcotics do 
so for financial gain and that quantities of U.S. Currency are found 
cs searcn warrants are servec For reasons mciucec m 
t your affiant believes the storage unit is being used as 
wnere narcot 
this affidav 
a drug distribution anc manufacturing center. 
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for 
packaging material, paraphernalia, clandestine laboratory equipment 
and records of controlled substances. Your affiant knows from training 
and experience that packaging material and clandestine laboratory 
equipment are an inherent part of controlled substance distribution 
and manufacturing operations and are needed to maintain an ongoing 
enterprise, as the substance must be manufactured, and must always 
leave the premises in a container of some kind. Your affiant knows 
from training and experience that narcotics paraphernalia is 
consistently found where controlled substance search warrants are 
served. Your affiant knows from the past execution of numerous 
controlled substance search warrants that s'j.s^eczs often keez records 
to show dates, times, amounts purchased, who purchased, financial gain 
and drug indebtedness. Your affiant also believes the premises should 
be searched for lease records and ownership records of the named 
premises. Also these items are consistently found during the execution 
of narcotics search warrants. 
.; .1 
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Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential 
informant reliable because: 
* 
The CIs have given their full names, date of birth, and address 
to your affiant. The CIs are not suspects in this investigation. CIT2 
is employed. The CI volunteered the information to law enforcement 
officers. 
CI#2 has provided the investigators on this case information 
that has led to the seizure of three clandestine methamphetamine 
laboratories within the last fifteen days. 
3oth CIs have provided a substantial amount of drug trafficking 
and manufacturing intelligence to the greater Salt Lake area, which 
have ben verified as true and accurate. ^ 
Your affiant asks the Court not to require the revelation of the 
name of the CI for fear of physical retaliation by the suspect(s). 
Threats of physical harm against individuals thought to be 
confidential informants are commonplace. 
Your affiant has had this Warrant/Affidavit reviewed by Assistant 
Attorney General Gary Heward and the warrant affidavit as been 
aooroved for presentation to the court. 
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WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the 
saizure of said items; immediately due to the storage shed having be*-
secured by officers while the warrant is prepared. 
() In the daytime. 
(X) At anytime day or night because there is good reason 
to believe it necessary to seize property prior to it being concealed, 
damaged, destroyed or altered, or for other good reasons to-wit. 
^ ^ 
DZT2CTZ7Z MIXZ MQKUGKTON 
A5TIAE 
SU3SC2H330 AND 
TKIS ,-J V 
SWORN TO 3EJ0R 
DAY OF. ™*!J<J~~ ., 1999. 
£f& 
JUZCl IN THE THIRD DISTRICT/COURT/ 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF S^LT LAKE, 
STATS OF UTAH. 
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